want to deal with a strong unified Vietnam under Hanoi leadership; that China preferred to deal with two independent Vietnamese states instead of a unified Vietnam, fifty million strong and with a long history of antipathy toward China. China thus relied on the United States to serve its interests by preventing a decisive military victory by Hanoi. A protracted war meant continued commitment of North Vietnamese men and resources toward the South, away from China. s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders had paid attention to the Vietnamese Communist revolution from the beginning. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other Chinese leaders had developed close relationships with Ho Chi Minh. Mao especially felt a rapport with Ho because they not only shared beliefs and values, but they also experienced comparable hardships during their revolutionary careers. 6 China's determination to offer material and manpower support for the DRV was based on a mixture of strategic and ideological considerations. Chinese leaders comprehended Vietnam's strategic importance to the security of China's southern border. Beijing regarded Vietnam along with Korea and Taiwan as the most likely places where the United States might establish bases and possibly initiate military hostilities. In the meantime, the Beijing leadership was anxious to see the model of the Chinese revolution implemented in Indochina. During the first Indochina war, between 1950 and 1954, Chinese leaders offered moral and material support for Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh. 7 After the 1954 Geneva conference, Beijing continued to anticipate possible U.S. intervention in the region that would turn Indochina into a U.S. military base from which to threaten China. the story. A better scholarly balance could be reached only with complete declassification of both Chinese and Vietnamese documents, but these Chinese materials, combined with information from American sources, will provide a fresh understanding of China's role in the Vietnam War. The great unfinished task of the Vietnamese revolution, as defined by Hanoi in the aftermath of the 1954 Geneva Conference, was to unify all of Vietnam under its rule. By 1958, it seemed apparent to Hanoi that this goal could not be achieved except by military force against the southern regime, and domestic and international conditions appeared propitious for a resumption of the armed struggle in the South, with the socialist North serving as a base of support. Thus, beginning in 1959, Hanoi's strategy of armed struggle went forward in South Vietnam. 8 Beijing's advice to Hanoi was based on the CCP's own experiences during the Chinese revolution. The CCP leaders suggested that Hanoi conserve its military forces while maintaining close contact with the populace and awaiting opportunities for local uprisings. When Hanoi's leaders consulted with their Chinese counterparts concerning resumption of the armed struggle in the South, the CCP leaders argued that such action was premature and dangerous; it was too early to expose Hanoi's strength in the South. 9 In 1960, revolutionary prospects in South Vietnam looked good, and Chinese leaders agreed to give Hanoi full support. Beijing's reassessment of the situation in South Vietnam may have led to this shift, but Beijing had its own reasons for supporting Hanoi's new strategy for the liberation of South Vietnam. 10 The growth of u.S. military involvement in South Vietnam, culminating in the formal establishment of the u.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) in February 1962, caused Chinese leaders deep concern. They believed that the United States, which in their view had failed in Korea and Taiwan in the 1950s, was now expanding the war against China into Vietnam. From the Chinese perspective, Beijing's support for Hanoi's war of national liberation would serve to break "the ring of encirclement" by u.S. imperialism and thus increase the security of China. 11. In a meeting with General Chen Shiqu, Commander of the Engineering Corps, and other officers in mid-June, 1965, Zhou Enlai stressed this concern, saying The Chinese perception of internationalism also determined Beijing's support for Hanoi's drive to liberate South Vietnam. Beijing perceived Ho's war of national liberation as a vital part of a world proletarian revolutionary movement. According to Mao Zedong, the success of "national revolutionary" struggles was the key to the defense of socialist states from imperialist attack and to the ultimate success of the global revolutionary struggle. Achievement of world revolutionary objectives in the 1960s required the overthrow of the U.S.-dominated international order. U.S. military intervention in Vietnam in the early 1960s put Hanoi at the center of what could become a global revolution following the Chinese model. Thus, Chinese leaders believed it was their duty to assist Ho and his party in order to promote an Asia-wide or even world-wide rev0lution. I2 Deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations may also have affected Beijing's policy of supporting Hanoi's war of national liberation. Mao appeared to resent Stalin's role in dividing countries at the end of World War II, and Khrushchev's lukewarm support of Ho Chi Minh and his struggle for Vietnamese unification. I3 16 In the early 1960s, when Soviet policy toward Indochina was equivocal at best, Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese government regarded China as the only reliable source of military supplies for their revolutionary causeY Even though, under Brezhnev and Kosygin, Moscow adopted a more active policy of support for the DRV, Ho Chi Minh continued to look to China for ways to achieve unification and independence. Western analysts have long believed that there was conflict between Hanoi and Beijing over the question of united Sino-Soviet assistance in support of HanoLl8 Ho was disheartened by the BeijingMoscow dispute. He regarded the Soviet Union and China as Vietnam's big brother and big sister, and he hoped for united Sino-Soviet support for his revolutionary cause in Vietnam. Although divergent opinions toward China most likely existed within Hanoi's elite, Ho Chi Minh continued to seek a special relationship with China. He characterized the Vietnamese and Chinese peoples as "comrades and brothers" who go through thick and thin together. 19 Ho and other North Vietnamese leaders traveled frequently to Beijing, where they consulted with Chinese leaders concerning nearly every major development in their war of national liberation in South Vietnam. North Vietnamese leaders' determination to fight against U.S. aggression deeply impressed Mao and Zhou. China's leaders had great esteem for those Vietnamese leaders who were in charge of the armed struggle in the South. 20 Appearing well-informed and following the events in Vietnam closely, Mao and Zhou showed sincere concern for Hanoi's drive to 16 unite all of Vietnam. It was Mao's view that China must provide whatever Hanoi needed for the war in the South. He carefully studied Hanoi's request for aid from China, and even ordered mosquito nets for all North Vietnamese soldiers because he thought that the hot and humid south of Vietnam must be infested with mosquitoes and ants. When a food products factory in Shanghai began to manufacture food especially for Vietnamese soldiers, Mao ordered that the hardtack must be light and nutritious. Zhou, too, repeatedly emphasized that China's aid to Hanoi's war in the South was the most important job for the Chinese. In March 1965, he personally went to Hanoi to arrange for shipments of supplies. Believing that the United States would blockade South Vietnam, he urged that Chinese supplies be shipped to Vietnam as qUickly as possible. Because supplies for the most part were carried by Vietnamese soldiers and women, Zhou directed that each package of supplies should weigh less than thirty kilograms. 21 In order to meet Hanoi's urgent needs, Beijing gave highest priority to supplying arms and military equipment to Hanoi. Between 1961 and 1972, China supplied Hanoi with 280 122-mm howitzers, 960 57 -mm antiaircraft guns, and 20,237 mortars, while the People's Liberation Army (PLA) received 200 howitzers, 2,000 antiaircraft guns, and 17,000 mortars. The Chinese version of the Soviet-designed AK-47 automatic rifle, which was manufactured in China after 1956, was provided to nearly all the regular PAVN soldiers even before the PLA soldiers had been equipped. Often, when Hanoi's requests exceeded China's production capability, Beijing transferred arms and equipment directly from the PLA to Hanoi's inventory. In 1969 Hanoi badly needed 107 -mm rocket launchers, but they were no longer produced in China. Beijing then consigned all of the PLA's stock to Vietnam. 22 Several western studies argue that China never actually supported Hanoi's decision to employ an offensive strategy in South Vietnam; that Beijing feared expansion of the fighting into China, and thus desired only that Hanoi continue an extended war of attrition. 2J In 1964 China had few planes and airfields in the areas close to North Vietnam. JJ At an Air Force war meeting on the evening of 6 August, Commander of the Chinese Air Force Liu Yalou recommended that the 7th Air Corps headquarters move from Xingning, Guangdong, to Nanning to assume a command role in the Guangxi and Leizhou peninsula areas; and that the 12th Fighter Division and the 3d AAA Division be transferred to Nanning from Quzhou, Zhejiang, and Zhangzhou, Fujian, respectively. He suggested that the Navy also send one of its fighter divisions to Hainan Island, and that additional airfields and radar installations be constructed in Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou. Mao Zedong immediately approved these measures, all of which were carried out within a few weeks. J4 In addition, the 17th Fighter Division (less the 49th regiment, which was transferred from Tangshan, Hebei, to Kunming) advanced from Kunming to Mengzi, while the 26th Fighter Division at Suixi and the 9th Fighter Division at Guangzhou were ordered to get ready for action at their current positions. Eight other air divisions plus one all-weather fighter regiment were assigned as the second echelon to support the front line. J5 Construction began on three new airfields (Ningming, Tianyang, and GUilin) in Guangxi, while a small airfield near the Laotian border at Simao and one near the Burma border at Xiangyun were extended to accommodate jet fighters. J6 New long-range early warning and ground-control-intercept radar systems were installed. Especially, one radar regiment moved into the airfield at Ningming, twelve miles The most significant development was the deployment to North Vietnam, on 6-7 August 1964, of a fighter regiment with thirty-six MIGs. These aircraft were based at the newly built airfield at Phuc Yen, twelve miles northwest of Hanoi. Since the DRV had no combat air force at the time, Washington believed that the MIGs were Chinese. Recently released Chinese sources indicate that these MIGs belonged to the DRV's first fighter regiment, which was organized in September 1957 by China and trained in China. J8 During 1963 and 1964, senior officers of the PLA and PAVN held several conferences to discuss military cooperation in case of u.S. invasion.J9 Again, the details of those meetings are unknown, but it is certain that the DRV wanted China to help strengthen its air defense. A group of Chinese air force engineers was sent to help upgrade Noi Bai airfield at Phuc Yen. By the summer of 1964, that airfield was ready for use by jet fighters, and the fighter regiment of thirty-six Chinese-made MIGs was based there. 40 Although one regiment of North Vietnamese fighters posed no threat to American air power in Southeast Asia, future u.S. air raids would carry with them the risk of a challenge from the North Vietnamese air force, or even from Chinese fighters. 41 Although these military moves in China, as American scholar Allen Whiting has argued, were designed to deter further u.S. expansion of the war in the South and bombardment in the North, they also reflected Beijing's perception of the international situation. 42 By the mid-1960s, after 37. According to the memoirs of Liu Yuti, Deputy Commander of the 7th Air Corps, the number of radars in Guangxi was increased from thirty-six to ninety-four, including the most advanced systems in the Chinese inventory. Liu Yuti and Jiao Hongguang, "Operations against Invading American Planes in the Chinese-Vietnamese Border Area in Guangxi," in Wang Renshen et ai. On 8 April 1965, Chinese radar tracked two U.S. Navy F-4Bs over the Yulin naval base on Hainan Island. The Chinese military was alerted, and the intrusion was regarded as a new U.S. provocation against China. The next day when eight U.S. navy F-4Bs in two groups intruded over Hainan Island, four Jian-5s (MIG-17) of the Navy's 8th Aviation Division were sent up to intercept the second group of F-4Bs, but Chinese pilots were instructed not to fire unless fired upon. In the initial engagement, neither side fired. According to Chinese reports, during the next round an F-4B fired two AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles, which overshot and hit a Phantom. 50 This account cannot be corroborated in American sources. The U.S. pilots believed that they were flying thirty-six miles southwest of Hainan Island, while the Pentagon insisted that American aircraft were prohibited from flying into China's air space. In any event, the incident forced Beijing to change its policy. 51 The beginning of sustained U. 52 In a four-point statement to Pakistan's leader to be forwarded to President Johnson on 2 April 1965, Zhou Enlai expressed China's policy toward U.S. aggression in Vietnam. China would not provoke a war with the United States, he said. But he stressed Beijing's continued willingness to provide aid to any country opposing U.S. aggression. Zhou warned that if the United States imposed war on China, including the use of nuclear weapons, the Chinese would not limit their response, implying that China would carry the war throughout Southeast Asia. 53 As early as February 1965, Washington had informed China that it had no intention of destroying North Vietnam, nor any desire for a direct confrontation with ChinaY However, U.S. warplanes' intrusion into Hainan Island air space on two consecutive days, along with sustained bombing of North Vietnam, increased Beijing's concerns. On 9 April the PLA General Staff Headquarters made a full report about the incident over Hainan to Zhou Enlai and the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP. The report stated that the American military aircraft's actions constituted a direct threat to China, and requested permission for the PLA air force to attack U.S. warplanes over China's air space. The CMC immediately granted approval. Zhou Enlai pointed out that the existing policy did not suit the current situation. Mao concurred, and ordered that the best units of the Air Force and Navy be sent to southern China to strike relentless blows at any U.S. aircraft that invaded China's air space. 55 On 12 April the Chinese Air Force stressed that its troops should not only be poised for combat over border areas but should be on standby for a possible large-scale war inside China. 56 63. Chinese records show that the PLA Air Force shot down two F-4Bs on 24 April, two A-4Bs on 1 May, and two A-6As on 21 August, while the U.S. Navy admitted to the downing of one F-4C on 26 June. In terms of the 21 August incident, the Chinese pilot claimed that he had shot down a third plane, but did not count it because the wreckage was not recovered inside China. 74 He met with Mao, who was conducting an inspection tour in Hunan, and asked that China help construct roads in North Vietnam. Ho asserted that in order to step up insurgency in the South to match the U.S. escalation, he needed to build infiltration routes and move his troops south. Ho handed Mao a sketched map of twelve roads he wanted China to build or repair, and Mao immediately telephoned Zhou Enlai in Beijing to make arrangements to do the work. 75 Prior to 1965, the land route for supplies was secondary to the sea route; 70 percent of Chinese supplies was shipped to the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) via this sea route. '!\vo ports on Hainan 80 North Vietnamese leaders appeared to be satisfied with China's response to Hanoi's requests. During his visit to Beijing in early June, Van Tien Dung told Luo Ruiqing that the Vietnamese were able to fight the war by themselves, with Chinese military and material support, because the u.s. had involved its ground troops only in the South while bombing the North from the air. However, he wanted China to send two antiaircraft artillery divisions to defend Hanoi and the railroads between Hanoi and the Chinese border. During further discussion, Van Tien Dung laid out Hanoi's need for Chinese military involvement under other contingencies. He stated that China should provide Hanoi with the services of its Air Force and Navy if the u.S. Air Force and Navy became involved in supporting a South Vietnamese invasion of the North. As to the form that Chinese air support could take, Hanoi believed that: (1) China could send volunteer pilots to fly Vietnamese planes in combat; (2) Chinese pilots and planes could operate from Vietnamese air fields; or (3) Chinese planes could take off from air bases in China to engage Americans over Vietnam. In the event of a u.S. ground attack on the North, Chinese troops were to serve as Hanoi's strategic reserve, ready to assist in defense or to launch a counterattack to take back the strategic initiative. Again, Luo's answer was in the affirmative; Chinese troops would enter the war in the form and at the time Hanoi preferred, and they would be under Hanoi's command. 81 However, in 1988 Vietnamese scholars told their American counterparts that in June 1965 China had informed Hanoi that it would be unable to provide air cover for North Vietnam despite an earlier promise to do so. The Vietnamese "White Book" of 1979 also revealed that in July 1965 Beijing had refused Hanoi's request to send Chinese pilots to Vietnam because the Chinese believed that "the time was not appropriate."82 Although the Chinese sources cited above clearly differ from these Vietnamese accounts, there are several points worth noting. Beijing appeared to have made a general promise in 1964 to provide North Viet- nam with air cover. The question could be raised as to whether China would have been able to provide the kind of air support that would have been effective against the Americans at a time when the Chinese economy was such that China appeared unable to modernize its own Air Force. But Le Duan's visit to Moscow in the spring of 1965 appeared fruitful. The Soviet Union agreed to aid Hanoi with a sophisticated air defense system, and asked China to allow the Soviet Air Force to use one or two airfields in southern China, on the pretext of providing aid to Hanoi with MIG-21s. Of course, the Chinese turned down the Soviet request. 83 However, this development might have forced Beijing's leaders to take a second look at their promise to provide air cover for Hanoi. Hanoi's conditions for receiving Chinese air support, set out in June 1965, offered Beijing the opportunity to decide the appropriate time for Chinese intervention. Thus, a Chinese decision about military intervention would be based not only upon Hanoi's request, but also upon U.S. actions.
Although China's military commitment to Hanoi was definite, Beijing's leaders had no intention of provoking a direct Sino-American confrontation under the current circumstances. In 1965, Zhou Enlai repeatedly told foreign leaders that China would not initiate war with the United States, but would be ready to fight back if Washington imposed war on China. 84 In order to avoid putting China in a politically and diplomatically disadvantageous position, Beijing did not want the Chinese military involvement in North Vietnam to receive excessive publicity. All troops deployed to North Vietnam were disguised by designating them as the Chinese Rear Services, and Chinese soldiers were dressed in PAVN uniforms, while the railway engineering troops continued to wear their blue work clothes. 85 Hanoi initially wanted the Chinese to proVide air defense down to the 19th parallel, but Beijing, in spite of its strong commitment to Hanoi's cause, made it clear that Chinese AAA units in North Vietnam should not be deployed beyond the 21st parallel. R6 One conclusion that might be drawn is that Beijing did not wish to give America any excuse to exploit the situation, but another view is that Hanoi did not want the outside world to know about North Vietnamese weaknesses in their war against the United States. The North Vietnamese, who had always considered themselves strong and independent, were sensitive about being in a position of dependence upon China's Chinese leaders were aware of Vietnamese sensitivities. Prior to their deployment to North Vietnam, Chinese troops were instructed about the "traditional friendship" between China and Vietnam and they were reminded of China's international obligations. The Political Department of the PLA issued a "discipline handbook," requiring Chinese soldiers to "respect the Vietnamese government and the People's Army of Vietnam," and "not to contend for triumphs and captures."H9 In short, Beijing would keep Chinese military operations in line with Hanoi's demands. There is little evidence to support the assertion that China's support was conditional or used as a bargaining device in the Sino-Soviet dispute. 9o
FolloWing intensified U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and the introduction of U.S. combat units into South Vietnam, both Hanoi and Beijing were concerned about the possibility of a U.S. invasion of North Vietnam. Few could be under any illusions, especially in light of Washington's misreading of China's signals in the Korean War and Pyongyang's ignoring of China's warnings about a U.S. landing at Inchon in 1950. This time Beijing would move forward more resolutely. On 9 June a special division-size organization of the PLA was deployed to the northeast coast of the DRY. With more than 20,000 military personnel, it consisted of three combat engineering regiments, one artillery regiment, one antiaircraft artillery regiment, one motor transport regiment, one landline communications regiment, one naval transport group, and one submarine cable engineering group. Its mission, according to the CMC's order, was 87 
*
to assist the PAVN in defending the coast, while building defense and security works along the coast and on some major islands. 91 Despite their engineering mission in North Vietnam, the combatoriented structure of Chinese troops was a clear indication of their role. The engineering regiment received a reinforcement of one 37-mm antiaircraft artillery battalion, one 85-mm field gun company, one 82-mm mortar company, and other service companies, numbering about 4,000 soldiers. The engineering battalions had a strength of four companies supported by antiaircraft machine gun, heavy machine gun, recoilless rifle, and signal platoons.92 From Beijing's standpoint, this deployment would provide first-line defense, along with the railway engineering units, which were also ordered to prepare for combat should the U.S. launch ground attacks. 93 After the completion of the defense work along the northeast coast in October 1966, the Chinese government continued to help Hanoi build a second defense line in the Red River Delta. That project stretched over hundreds of miles, from Phu Binh in the north to Ninh Binh in the south, and from Vinh Phu in the west to Haiphong in the east. Underground structures and defense works were built at some 121 sites throughout eight provinces of the DRV. The southernmost work site was at Dat Bang Son, only six miles from the 17th parallel. According to Chinese sources, Beijing sent another three engineering regiments, along with several AAA battalions, totaling 16,000 soldiers, to engage in construction work in the Red River Delta. 94 Prior to crossing the Yalu River in mid-October, 1950, no preparations in the form of prepositioned defense works and advance base development had been made for China's intervention in the Korean war. Now, in 1965-66, massive defense works, together with the Chinese deployment of troops, would permit a forceful response to U.S. attacks on North Vietnam. On 27 April 1965, the Chinese and North Vietnamese governments signed an agreement in Beijing that China would undertake some one hundred projects to increase the transportation capacity of the rail lines between Hanoi and China, including improving existing railroads and facilities, building a new link line between Thai Nguyen and Kep along with new rail yards, and widening and reinforcing bridges. The 2d Railway Engineering Division at Changsha was assigned to take the mission and designated as the 1st Unit of the Chinese Rear Services, with a strength of six engineering regiments and one AAA regiment from the Army 63d AAA Division. On 23 June 1965, the entire unit was deployed along the rail lines between Hanoi, Yunan, and Guangxi. 96
Hanoi's goal in the war, William Duiker notes, was not to totally defeat the enemy but to foil Washington's war scheme in Vietnam up to the point where the Americans would be willing to "accept a negotiated settlement of the war."97 However, North Vietnam was one of the world's poorest nations, possessing neither munitions plants nor industry vital to its war effort. Only a large infusion of aid from China could enable the country to survive and achieve this strategic objective. The railroads between Hanoi and China thus not only formed a vital element of North Vietnam's military-industrial complex as a channel for imports, but they substantiated Beijing's pledge that "China provides a vast rear." The existing railroads were meter-gauge track in poor condition, and required transshipment for rail cars at points of entry from the standard gauge of the Chinese rail line. Improvement of the rail system was vital. Thus, the Chinese command concentrated its manpower and resources on the construction of a rail bypass around Hanoi, a rail line between Kep and Thai Nguyen, and on converting much of the track from meter gauge to dual gauge. Beginning in September 1965, U.S. strategy shifted to interdiction of supplies between the border and Hanoi. Rail cars, bridges, and tracks were among the earliest American targets. Chinese troops were called upon to repair the 554 kilometers of railroad between Hanoi and China damaged by U.S. air attacks. In 1967 U.S. bombing of rail lines north of Hanoi reached its peak. In June alone, U.S. warplanes dropped 9.6 tons of bombs on every kilometer of the rail lines, while hitting every meter of major bridges and rail yards with 4.4 tons and 1.3 tons, respectively.98 The Chinese railway engineering troops, having learned from the Korean War, were determined to maintain an uninterrupted transportation line in North Vietnam. The rail complex at Kep, for example, was bombed forty-eight times and suffered severe damage from almost every strike, but it was always quickly repaired and remained operational throughout the air war.99
Probably the greatest challenge to keeping the North Vietnamese transportation system open came when U.S. leaders decided to attack targets within and near Hanoi. In the summer of 1967, the Long Bien Bridge (the ex-Paul Doumer Bridge) became a prime target. Thus, the stage was set for a major effort against U.S. interdiction. The Long Bien Bridge, on the outskirts of Hanoi, served as the rail entry to Hanoi for the east (Haiphong) and the west (Lao Cai) lines, as well as feeder lines from Kep, Thai Nguyen, and Dong Dang to the north. On 11 August this 1,680-meter bridge was hit by U.S. bombers. One rail span dropped into the water and two highway spans were damaged. Chinese soldiers were ordered to complete its repair within forty days. The next day two Chinese railway engineering battalions threw themselves into the work around the clock, while a rail ferry was established to by-pass the bombed-out bridge. By 30 September the bridge was restored for traffic. 1\venty-seven trains passed over the bridge during the first twenty-four hours. The Long Bien Bridge suffered repeated attacks by U.S. warplanes, but it was usually back in use within a month or so. In December two heavy attacks put the bridge out of action for six months, but Chinese engineers used a ferry and a pontoon bridge to provide a by-pass for the traffic across the Red River. 1OO Indeed, U.S. air attacks on the North Vietnamese rail transportation system produced considerable damage. North Vietnamese leaders later acknowledged that the bombing destroyed virtually all transportation and communications facilities built after 1954.1°1 However, U.S. bombing Improvements and new construction not only resulted in a substantially increased capacity for moving Chinese supplies to North Vietnam, and from there to the South, but also provided flexibility and better yearround movement. In an assessment of the effect of U.S. air strikes on North Vietnam, the Institute for Defense Analysis stated that the DRY's transportation system by the end of 1967 had become less vulnerable to interdiction than prior to initiation of the Rolling Thunder program. is most important to note that American policy makers were wrong in believing that bombing North Vietnam would force Hanoi to keep manpower there rather than send it south. Since thousands of Chinese troops were involved in the war against interdiction in North Vietnam, Hanoi was actually able to free up a large number of its own men and thus to embark upon a further expansion of fighting in the South.
Despite early concerns about U.S. ground attack on the DRV, the Chinese troops deployed in North Vietnam were actually engaged in a relentless antiair campaign during the years 1965 to 1968. Rolling Thunder's focus was on strategic persuasion, attempting to coerce the North Vietnamese into abandoning their support of the southern insurgency. Initially, Rolling Thunder strikes concentrated on targets in the southern part of the DRV; after mid-1965, the focus switched from strategic persuasion to interdiction. The bombings were extended to important bridges and segments of rail lines between Hanoi and the Chinese border. On 24 July 1965, the DRV's Military General Staff Directorate formally requested Beijing to send two Chinese antiaircraft artillery divisions to defend North Vietnam not later than 1 August. The next day, Beijing informed Hanoi that two AAA divisions and one regiment would enter Vietnam immediately, and take responsibility for defending two railroads between Hanoi and China. 106 On 1 August 1965, two army AAA divisions (61st and 63d) of four regiments each (including the 23d regiment from the Air Force) became the first Chinese air defense forces deployed in North Vietnam. They were principally responsible for protecting supply routes and facilities north of Hanoi. Late in 1966, China added a third division (62d), along with five independent battalions, to the defenses around the Thai Nguyen iron and steel complex as a response to heavier attacks on Hanoi, Haiphong, and the border area. By March 1969 (when Chinese forces were withdrawn), sixteen divisions (Sixty-three regiments), together with other support units, involving a total of 150,000 Chinese troops, had served in air defense on a six-to eight-month rotation basis. 107 According to the official history, Chinese air defense units fought their first battle on 9 August 1965 against American planes attacking the Yen Bai area, supposedly downing one F-4C jet. On 23 August another AAA unit also claimed that it had shot down one U.S. plane and damaged another over the Kep area. But the real combat between Chinese AAA During the Vietnam War, Chinese AAA units were mainly equipped with outdated 37-mm and 8S-mm guns, which were ineffective against modern U.S. aircraft. The Chinese troops developed the strategy of concentrating antiaircraft sites around significant targets. At Yen Bai, where Chinese engineering troops were involved in the construction of a large military complex, including a long runway and cave structures, the 61st Division deployed two regiments to protect the area. Even smaller targets like the Tong IIoa Rail Bridge several miles south of Lang Son bristled with antiaircraft guns. As the air war continued, defenses were intensified around many important targets. For example, during the Air Force 7th AAA Division's tour of duty in North Vietnam, it operated twenty-four batteries around the Kep railroad classification yards. 109 In North Vietnam, concentrating antiaircraft guns maximized their effectiveness and formed the heaviest AAA environment in all aerial warfare. On 10-11 March 1967, the U.S. military flew 107 sorties in 33 groups against the Thai Nguyen Steel Complex. Chinese antiaircraft emplacements surrounded the steel plant and power plant. In two days of combat, the Chinese claimed that they shot down eighteen U.S. planes and damaged five, while capturing ten American pilots. On the Chinese side, thirteen people died and thirty-five were wounded, but the steel complex was little harmed. I1O During the battle, Chinese gunners were encouraged to aim at a particular attacker and fire at the closest possible range. According to one Chinese account, on 5 January 1968, when U.S. aircraft made systematic runs against targets along the rail line between Kep and Dap Cau, the Chinese antiaircraft units engaged the U.S. attackers eleven times. Ten times they used three to five or more AAA batteries to fire at one target. At the most intense, twelve batteries poured their fire on a single enemy plane. As a result, they claimed their victory that day, shooting down nine U.S. planes and damaging three others, while only one rail bridge under their protection suffered bombing damage. 111 Chinese antiaircraft gun batteries shifted position from day to day to increase their effectiveness against attacking planes. Due to Washingtonimposed political restraints on air warfare over North Vietnam, throughout the Rolling Thunder operations U.S. planes often used specific air corridors going to and departing from a target. l12 Chinese units adopted a "fire and move" tactic to deceive U.S. crews with dummy sites and thus to ambush attackers. Chinese statistics from nine divisions show that they shot down 125 planes, 20 percent of their total claims, during their move-and-ambush operations. ll3 Antiaircraft artillery in North Vietnam provided the most effective air defense. Heavy fire from the ground often prevented U.S. warplanes from attacking their targets from low altitudes. The percentage of hits on the rail system, according to Chinese calculations, dropped from 15.9 percent in 1965 to 9.5 percent in 1968. 114 The official DRV claim was 4,154 U.S. planes downed during the war. 11S The official number recorded by the United States is 1,096. It is impossible to reconcile this difference. However, factors which led to such disparity deserve to be noted. First, the defending Sides, including North Vietnamese and Chinese AAA units, and Soviet SAM units, on occasion might all claim to have shot down the same enemy plane. 116 Second, Hanoi might have lumped all downed and damaged planes together in its claims. Finally, Hanoi and the DRV leaders inflated claims to improve morale. Nevertheless, the Chinese record is impressive. During three years and nine months in North Vietnam, all Chinese antiaircraft artillery divisions, together with those units assigned to protect engineering troops, fought 2,153 engagements. 
Conclusion
In the mid-1960s, China's intention to use military force to counter the U.S. in Vietnam was obvious. The fundamental Chinese orientation was a combination of strategic interest and ideological commitment. The history of the People's Republic of China indicated that the U.S. threat to Chinese security was concentrated on three fronts: Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The Chinese leaders had not forgotten that the United States had supported the French during the First Indochina War. They thought that the United States would not easily swallow its setbacks in Korea and its failures in supporting the Nationalists in Taiwan, and thus interpreted U.S. military escalation in Indochina as evidence of actual aggressive action directed toward China. From Beijing's standpoint, the long-anticipated U.S. invasion might actually happen this time, thus China's security seemed at stake. 120 Beijing increased China's support of Hanoi's drive to liberate the South, while at the same time quickly putting its own troops on the alert, and reinforcing its air defense system in south and southwest China. These actions were obviously undertaken with a sense of the potential risk of the conflict escalating into Chinese territory.
Mao Zedong's theory of world revolution determined China's response in aiding Vietnam and resisting the United States. Chinese leaders believed that Hanoi's war of national liberation in the South would tie down U.S. forces, thereby making less likely a military attack on China and other socialist countries. Ho Chi Minh had a close personal relationship with Mao and other Chinese leaders and he shared many of Mao's ideological beliefs. Beijing believed IIo's cause of national liberation was compatible with Mao's rejection of the Soviet "revisionist" orientation toward imperialism. Hanoi was putting Mao's concept of world revolution into practice.
Prior to the summer of 1964, Beijing leaders believed that Vietnamese forces, with China's support, were sufficient to defeat those of the Saigon regime. However, Washington's gradual increase of its air attacks on the DRV and introduction of combat units into South Vietnam in March 1965 convinced both Beijing and Hanoi that Washington was bent on invading North Vietnam and possibly China. Beijing felt it necessary to reinforce China's military power in the regions adjacent to North Vietnam and to take other measures to prepare for a possible war with the United States. The shooting down of U.S. planes became one manifestation of China's support for Hanoi that was also intended to convey warnings to Washington. Issues of overflight did worry American policy makers, who in return repeatedly imposed restrictions on military operations over North Vietnam.
It is impossible to say with certainty what would have happened if the U.S. had followed the Harry Summers approach and invaded North Vietnam. However, the arrival of U.S. ground troops in the South forced Hanoi to seek more concrete evidence of Beijing's pledges to support the Vietnamese struggle for national liberation. If there had been any previous ambiguity in China's commitment to the cause of the DRV's struggle against U.S. invasion, by the spring of 1965, Beijing and Hanoi appeared to have precisely defined the circumstances under which China would send troops to Vietnam. Chinese leaders were under no illusions, especially in view of lessons they had learned from the Korean War, about the implications of agreeing to commit Chinese troops to defend North Vietnam even before any American troops crossed the 17th parallel. Sending Chinese troops for supportive and security purposes was a clear indication of this. Hanoi had counted on Chinese involvement as a deterrent to U.S. intervention in the war. With assurances of military commitment from China, Hanoi had few fears of further escalation by the United States and appeared perfectly capable of defeating the Americans by relying on its own forces. This was obViously the Vietnamese leaders' preference.
Chinese leaders did not devise their Vietnam policy on the basis of hard and fast principles. They shaped China's policy in response to Hanoi's requests and U.S. actions. Chinese leaders were well informed about Hanoi's strategy in the war of national liberation while watching every move of the U.S. in Vietnam closely. There was enough evidence that China would enter the war on North Vietnam's side once Hanoi made its request. China's support of Hanoi's war effort was on a scale substantially greater than that provided to the Viet Minh against the French. If there had been a need for more Chinese troops to defend the North, they would have been sent. Chinese leaders were aware of Vietnamese national pride and their sensitivity about self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Beijing let the DRV leaders take the initiative in deciding whether and when PLA troops should go into Vietnam. Hanoi made it clear that the DRV did not want massive Chinese intervention unless the United States launched a total attack on North Vietnam. Thus, a U.S. ground invasion would have forced Hanoi (as a last resort) to request that Beijing fulfill China's commitment. Then, China would have had little room to maneuver, but would have been obliged to engage the Americans directly. It is clear now-although it was not at all clear at the MILITARY HISTORY * 761 time-that Washington's concern about Chinese intervention in North Vietnam saved the U.S. from repeating its Korean War mistake.
Nevertheless, Beijing made every effort to avoid a recurrence of the circumstances of the Korean War. Chinese leaders clearly interpreted Washington's self-imposed restrictions on U.S. bombing in the North as a sign that the United States did not want to expand the conflict with China. By sending Chinese troops to North Vietnam, China probably hoped to deter but not antagonize Washington. Under conditions short of a U.S. ground invasion of the DRV, China's commitment to Hanoi was limited. Beijing never allowed Chinese planes to operate over Vietnamese territory, and unwillingly deployed Chinese AAA units to the areas beyond the 21st parallel. China's weak economy and lack of military modernization may have made Beijing less committed to modern air warfare in Vietnam. However, strategic considerations may have done more to determine the nature of China's involvement in the Vietnam War. The objectives of China's strategy toward the Vietnam War were to support Hanoi with a sizable Chinese military presence in North Vietnam but to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. This strategy seems to have worked; there was no direct Sino-American confrontation over Vietnam. Hanoi and Washington agreed to negotiate in late 1968, and Beijing began to withdraw Chinese troops from Vietnam in early 1969. Although Beijing's concern about China's security was shifting to the increasing Soviet threat in the north, the Beijing leadership promised that Chinese troops would return if the Americans came back. 121 During the Vietnam War, China played an important role in Hanoi's victory over the Americans. Unfortunately, since the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations in the late 1970s, Hanoi now attempts to deny China's role in the war. Hanoi's own part in achieving victory has been inflated while China's involvement has been downplayed. Any attempt to comprehend the Vietnam War suffers from this distortion. So also do those who have raised questions concerning the wisdom of American restraint in Washington's conduct of the war. As both past tragedy and future danger lie in contemporary ignorance, today's scholarship must endeavor to construct an objective history of the Vietnam War. Toward that goal, this study offers an evaluation of the Vietnam War from a Chinese perspective. 
